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Introduction
On January 25, 1942, Thailand followed the Japanese example and declared war
on the United States and Great Britain. The reasons for Thailand's entry into the war
remain controversial. The extent and timing of Japanese pressure and the genesis of the
Thai commitment to the Axis side are in dispute. There is not a generally accepted view
on why Thailand declared war; however, the issue has been thus far analyzed principally
in consideration of Thai national interest. This paper provides a different approach by
focusing on the main decision-maker: Thai Prime Minister Pibun Songkram, as the key to
solve the Thai enigma. Whether his underlying motives were patriotism, a feeling of
compelling duty to serve his people, or a hunger for power, Pibun resolved to hold his
post, strengthen his position, and make his power absolute, even at the price of involving
Thailand in war. Opportunism dictated his actions, his words or promises were to him of
slight importance, and his piety amounted to using religion for political reasons. Pibun
had but one principle: to stay in power. These motives, above all others, determined
Thailand's policies during World War II.
The paper opens with a sketch of the background of Thailand's foreign relations
focusing on its dealings with Japan. Later, it introduces Pibun and his position in Thai
domestic politics. It presents Pibun's role in the conflict over territory disputed with
French lndo-China-the first instance when domestic considerations determined the
Prime Minister's foreign policy. The consequences of the dispute reflected on ThaiJapanese relations are further evaluated. An analysis of Pibun' s decisions immediately
preceding January 25, 1942 concludes the argumentation.
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Thailand's International Position before the War
By the beginning of the 1930s, only two Asian nations, Japan and Thailand, had
managed to retain complete independence from the European powers. Even so, during the
century these two had to make political concessions, sign unequal commercial treaties,
cede land, and grant extraterritoriality to European nationals. Both of these nations
attempted to modernize, industrialize, and develop the potential to command Western
respect. The Japanese transition occurred at a rapid pace. Following the Meiji Restoration
of 1868, reforms of the Japanese economic and political system were successful and
rendered Japan sufficiently strong to defeat Russia in the war of 1904-05. From that point
forward, Japan was looked upon by other Asian nations as an example. The Japanese
considered themselves the older brothers of other Asians.
Not unlike Germany or Italy, Japan gradually became a militaristic state with
expansionist ambitions. Japan was determined to pursue its interests in Manchuria,
Korea, Taiwan, mainland China, and later in Siberia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma,
French lndo-China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Regarding Thailand, located in
the heart of what the Japanese claimed to be their new southern Co-Prosperity Sphere,
there were mixed views among Japanese leaders. However, the Emperor categorically
demanded in 193 8 that Thailand could not be attacked by Japanese troops.1 Japanese
plans provided for political, economic and defensive arrangements between the sphere's
members.
The slogan "Asia for Asians" summarized the guiding ideology for the expansion.
Japan desired the perception of being a liberator. This ideology could be justified in India,

I Thadeus E. Flood, "Japan 's Relations with Siam: 1928-1941 " (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1986), 191195.
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Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, and the Philippines, under the colonial rule of European
powers or the United States, even though the "liberation" was by no means unanimously
greeted; however, in the cases of Korea, the lands of modem China and Taiwan, and
Siberia the slogan clearly did not apply. In French Indo-China, Japan tolerated the
European protectorate as long as the Vichy government was cooperative. Obviously then,
ideology was not the cause of the struggle: it was merely an attempt to justify it. Yet,
since it was the official ideology, it would make it difficult for Japan to invade an
independent Thailand.
The transformation of Thailand into a modem state was a slow process. Thai
commerce was not very developed: foreigners and members of the Chinese minority
conducted as much· as 95% of business. Politically, Thailand remained an absolute
monarchy until 1932, when it became a constitutional monarchy. Thai foreign policy
through late 1930 focused on revising unequal treaties containing extraterritoriality
clauses. Other Thai ambitions included developing trade, and promoting Thai interests on
the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. The signature of a new treaty by Japan followed an
economic mission led by Yunosuke Yasukawa in 1936. The mission not only led to the
new treaty, but it also stimulated Thai-Japanese trade. 2
The lands constituting the Kingdom of Thailand changed over the course of
history. By the 1930s, France had taken some territories forming modern Laos and
Cambodia claimed by Thailand. Thailand also frequently looked on its traditional foe
Burma for possible territorial gains. Reclaiming the land lost to France was one of the
priorities of Thai foreign policy. Thus, Japan emerged as a potential natural ally in the
attempts to recover what Thais considered lost territories.
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Formal Thai-Japanese relations began on Thai initiative with the Declaration of
Amity and Commerce of September 26, 1887.3 A related treaty came into effect in 1898,
with a protocol providing for extraterritoriality for Japanese subjects until Thai laws were
reformed.4 Throughout the 1920s trade between the two countries grew steadily, but there
were no close ties. During Japanese actions in Manchuria after 1931, the Thai
government made efforts to control its Chinese minority who actively protested the
Japanese invasion, but this was just as likely out of a desire to keep internal order as to
express pro-Japanese sympathies. Until 1932, Thai-Japanese relations were friendly, but
not very close. 5
On February 24, 1933, the Lytton Report, which condemned the Japanese
invasion of Manchllria, was submitted to the League of Nations. The League passed a
resolution denouncing Japanese actions in Manchuria, with only Thailand abstaining.
Shortly following the session, Yosuka Matsuoka, the Japanese emissary to the League,
warmly thanked the Thai representative offering Japanese support if Thailand chose to
cast off the European yoke. There were numerous interpretations of that act. Japanese
sources often emphasized how much the two countries were alike in being mistreated by
the West. The Japanese press praised Thailand for understanding its Asian brother. Thai
sources tended to explain the vote as a sign of true neutrality to which Thailand had been
committed.
After Thailand underwent a revolution in 1932, which introduced constitutional
monarchy, bureaucrats like Phrya Mano formed much of the new government and
vigorously attempted reactionary actions. Japan remained rather reserved during the coup

2 Bangkok Chronicle, July 18, 1940.
3 Kiyoshi Inoue, "A Century of Japan-Thai 'Friendship,"' AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 19, no. 4 ( 1987): 52.
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of June 20, 1933, which the Pibun-Pahon faction led against the old, traditionally royalist
nomenclature. Although the coup leaders approached it for arms and funds, Japan
promised only future financial support. Japan, however, was the first nation to recognize
the new government. Since Pibun was a leader inspired by Ataturk and Mussolini, with
dictatorial sympathies, Thai-Japanese relations from that point on began to strengthen. 6 In
1934, Thai military officers and cadets went to Japan for training. From that year on,
Thailand's trade with Japan was second only to trade with Great Britain. In 1935 and
1937, Sir Josiah Crosby, the chief British diplomat to Thailand described the Thai
attitude towards Japan as one of admiration for its economic and military strength mixed
with distrust of imperial ambitions. In his opinion, although Japan had a positive image in
the Thai press, the Thai military remained reserved. 7

Pibun Songkram
Pibun was born on July 14, 1898, to a family owning an orchard. An excellent
student, he finished the Thai Cadet School and Army Staff College and received a King's
Scholarship to study in France. Pibun became an outstanding figure in military science.
Later, when his respect among the politicians came from Pibun's military connections, his
scholastic abilities earned him the respect of the army. 8 His popularity could also be
attributed to his "attractive character. "9

4 Ibid., 53.
5 Charivat Santaputra, Thai Foreign Policy (Bangkok: Tharnmasat University, 1985), 151 .
6 Ibid., 161.
7 Ibid., 151-153.
8 Jayanta Kumar Ray, Portraits o/Thai Politics (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 191.
9 Benjamin A Batson and Shimizu Hajime, The Tragedy o/Wanit (Singapore: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
Special Publications Series No. I, 1990), 47.
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Pibun participated in the 1932 revolution, from which he emerged as Deputy
Commander-in-Chief. He joined forces with Mano to oust Pridi, of whose popularity they
were both jealous. As gossips of those days would have it, Pibun was also involved in
murdering Pridi's friend-Tasnai , who had been very popular in the military circles. 10 He
rose to prominence after the coup of June 20, 1933. The coup took place after Pibun
persuaded three senior colonels to resign in an act of protest against Mano's rule. 11
Having done that, to the colonels' surprise, he remained in power by retaining his own
post. 12 When one of the military leaders, Phrya Song, a hero of the first revolution, later
came back to Bangkok from foreign travels in the service of the state, Pi bun sent the
unwanted opponent out of Bangkok, to Chiang Mai. 13 The coup was successful, and
Pahon became the :Prime Minister with Pibun as his close aid. In the same year, Prince
Bowodaret led a rebellion to restore absolute monarchy. The dangerous upheaval was
crushed by Pibun, who thus became the unquestioned leader of the young military
faction, with his official title of Commander-in-Chief of all defense forces. 14
Pibun Songkram determined the course of Thai policies, including foreign policy,
after 1938. He actively participated in the Pahon government from 1933 until 1938, when
he became the Prime Minister at the age of thirty-five. The constitution enabled him to
appoint half of the Parliament, thus assuring him wide legislative support. The legislature
consisted mainly of military men, many of whom owed their appointment to Pibun. The
civilian legislators were often intimidated by Pibun's ex-classmate Adun Aduldejarat, the
Police General.

10 Ray, 71.
11 Ibid.
12 Later, Pibun' s wife surpri singly refused to credit him with the resignations, she wrote: "Worse still, the four senior
Colonels, the Four Tigers, by now retired from the government." Ibid., 194
13 Ibid., 72.
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Adun behaved like a Gestapo Chief. On the instruction of Pi bun, Adun
would shadow politicians, and harass them till they fell in line with Pibun. I once
found three to four policemen waiting for me in a car in front of my house, and
they followed me wherever I went. 15
Pibun argued that he could not be a dictator, because there always was a
parliament during his rule. 16 Thawee Bunyaketu, a civilian member of the government at
that time, provided a plausible explanation for the strange circumstance of a dictator coexisting with an active legislature. Even Asada Shunsuke, a Japanese diplomat to
Thailand at the time, taken by Pibun's "attractive character," later reckoned in an attempt
to decipher Pibun's actions during the war: "I(... ) imagine he reasoned like a sort of
dictator during the war years, when Hitler and Mussolini were at the zenith of their
power." 17
To strengthen his position, Pibun purged several opponents of the Pahon
government; his adversaries were sent to Tarutao and Tao Islands in 1933, and to Mac
Hong Son in 1934. After 1938, at least eighteen of his opponents were killed after an
unsuccessful coup in the course of arrests or later executions. 18 Since Thailand was a
constitutional monarchy, the position of the king could threaten Pibun. Under the Prime
Minister's leadership, the state sued the former King Rama for misappropriating six
million baht. As a result of the process, Rama VII's land and property were confiscated
while he lived in exile in England. Displaying of his picture became prohibited. The new
king's power was delegated to the regents throughout his education in Europe. As much

14 Ibid., 73 .
15 Ibid., 75.
16 Ibid., 195.
17 Batson and Shimizu, 63.
18 Thamsook Numnonda, "Pibulsongkram 's Thai Nation-Building Programme during the Japanese Military Presence,
1941-1945," J ournal ofSoutheast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 ( 1978): 244.
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as Pibun declared himself an advocate of democracy, he desired the aura of royalty, as
evident in his attempt to use the king's baton after rising to the rank of Field Marshal. 19
Pibun was a man with a lucid vision of transformed Thailand. The new Thailand
would be modernized and Westernized; it would have a reliable army; it would expand
territorially onto all lands that had belonged to Thailand in the past and those that were
always desired to belong to Thailand. Foremost, it would be a country under a great
leader, namely--Pibun.
Pibun's vision took shape during the 1930s, during a time of economic crisis and
political turmoil, when in other Asian and European nations dictatorial leaders were
experiencing peaks of popularity. This partly explains Pibun's remark during a Cabinet
meeting in April 1942:
The Japanese have the Emperor as their mentor. We Thais have nothing.
What we have are Nation, Religion, Monarch, and Constitution. Nation is still a
vision; Religion is not yet sacred enough; Monarch is just a child whom we can
see only in picture and Constitution is merely a notebook. When the country is in
trouble we cannot rely on anything. That is why I want you all to follow me-the
Prime Minister. . . .20
The government launched a carefully planned campaign designed to popularize the Prime
Minister. Newspapers were given adjectives which they should use when referring to
Pi bun, people were encouraged to display his pictures, the color green and the sign of the
cock were commonly used for decorations since Pi bun was born in the year of the cock,
on Wednesday, a day traditionally associated in Thai culture with green. Pibun's
appraisal of the campaign follows: "At present there is a tremendous propaganda to

19 Ray, 74.

20 Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-1945 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1977), 237.
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believe in the Leader. This should be considered a national theory. Whoever is the Prime
Minister must follow suit."21
Pibun's vision of transformed Thailand had two aspects. One was to solidify the
Thai people through nationalism. The other was for Thailand to acquire Western
appearances and thus to seem more cultured, such a Thailand would then be safer from
too blatant abuse by international powers.
We must be as cultured as other nations otherwise no country will come to
contact us. Or if they come, they come as superiors. Thailand would be helpless
and soon become colonized. But if we were highly cultured, we would be able to
uphold our integrity, independence, and keep everything to ourselves .... 22

Pibun aroused Thai nationalism using three issues to unify the Thai people: the
quest for recovery of territories lost to France, promotion of the rights of the Thai
majority over the Chinese minority, and the cult of the leader. He hoped that these
policies would provide him a lasting political base. The convenience of using the
powerful ideology of nationalism became evident when Pi bun had to deal with his
political opponents. He used the same ideology to expand the military. 23
To modernize the apparel worn by Thais, Pibun issued a proclamation on correct
dress. Men were supposed to wear hats, shoes and socks, long pants and jackets. Women
were to wear hats, shoes, blouses, and skirts.24 The new clothing styles were promoted
through decrees and government sponsored campaigns. Western clothing had to be worn
because "Thailand must follow a European example in order to make itself an influential
modern state. "25 How seriously Pibun took the reform shows in his speech broadcast on

21
22
23
24
25

Ibid., 237.
Pibun quoted in Tharnsook, " Pibulsongkram 's," 236.
Charivat, 161.
Tharnsook, Thailand, 238.
Ray, 85.
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the day after the declaration of war on the Allies: "My Dear Ladies, please do not take it
for granted that it is unnecessary to wear hats during the war-days. On the contrary, hats
have become more important than ever .... " 26 Women not wearing hats could not board
buses or enter government offices, even to pay taxes. 2728
Through the 1930s, it was common in Thailand not to wear shoes. Men would
frequently wear only a piece of cloth wrapped around their bodies or colored Chinese
trousers, while women would wear a sarong around their waists and possibly a blouse or
piece of cloth around their upper body. Pibun's attitude towards the way Thais dressed
showed his concern about Thailand as much as his desire for a totalitarian control over
the lifestyle of his people. It is interesting how in the attempt to Westernize Thailand,
Pibun tried to trans.plant behaviors that originated from pursuing individualism (fashion),
using a dictatorial decree with which all had to comply. To emphasize the effectiveness
of Pibun's pragmatism, he undoubtedly succeeded. Before the end of his first dictatorship,
he came to lead a hat-wearing nation.
The anti-Chinese sentiment on the Thai political scene that Pibun represented so
obviously can be traced to king Rama V, who reigned between 1910 and 1925. However,
no legal discrimination against the Chinese followed the King's prejudice. The 1933
Pahon government tried to discourage immigration by raising fees for newcomers while
encouraging Thais to undertake commercial activity. Chinese immigration into Thailand
caused by poverty in southern China and the relative prosperity of Thailand from its
rubber and tin industries, culminated between 1918 and 1931 when an estimated total of
95,000 Chinese arrived in Thailand annually. Between 1932 and 1945 the immigration

26 Pibun quoted in Thamsook, Thailand, 32.
27 Ibid.
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slowed to about 33,800 yearly. By the end of the 1930s, the Chinese minority numbered
about 2-3 million, which constituted roughly ten percent of the whole population. Yet, the
ten percent provided "70 percent of all skilled and unskilled non-agricultural labor." In
some estimates, more than 80 percent of Thai economy was under Chinese control. 29
Thais perceived the Chinese minority as more prosperous and more advanced. The
immigrants were more likely to use new technical advancements, such as bicycles. 30
The increase in Chinese population coincided with a change in other demographic
trends as well. More Chinese women began to settle in Thailand, thus slowing down the
assimilation process. On the contrary, Chinese communities grew around Chinese
temples and schools aimed at retaining their own national character. The Japanese
expansion in China intensified nationalism among the Chinese community in Thailand. It
found an expression in various political organizations and societies, many of which were
openly anti-Japanese.
The Chinese controlled much commerce in Thailand. They dominated fishing and
rice cultivation, while they shared exporting teak and tin with the Europeans. Typically,
Chinese labor utilized Western capital and technology, thus, effectively dividing
commerce between the two groups. 31 After his ascent to power in 1938, Pibun prohibited
the Chinese from certain jobs, such as the legal profession, rice-cultivation, selling bricks,
firewood, charcoal, torches, manufacturing hats, dresses, umbrellas, toys, food vending,

28 Ray, 85.
29 Chamvit Kasetsiri, "The First Phi bun Government and Its Involvement in World War II," Journal of the Siam
Society 62, part 2 (July 1974): 243.
30 Sakdi Rattanachai, interview by author, transcribed, Lampang, 14 July 1998.
3 1 Charivat, 157.
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and cutting or waving hair. 32 He also ordered the closing of nine out of the ten existing
Chinese newspapers. 33
The leader's person was yet another idea unifying the Thai. Pibun often addressed
the nation through radio broadcasts or newspaper articles: "Through these speeches and
writings Pibun asked the people to give support to his policy and at the same time tried to
project his personality so that trust and faith in--and fear of--him could be generated
among the masses. " 34 He was attractive to the people, viewed as "knowledgeable,
tolerant, hard-working, very sharp and, most important, he had much self-confidence. "35
Pibun was interested in the person of Napoleon and enjoyed comparing himself to
the Frenchman. An event that took place while the Premier was at a seaside resort
illustrated Pibun's outgrown ego. His radio broke down, so he requested through a phone
call to Bangkok that his favorite program be postponed until further notice. 36 Even if his
actions were to benefit the country, the manner in which Pibun chose to rule was
autocratic. For example, Pibun decided to eliminate illiteracy in the armed forces. To
accomplish his goal, the leader decided that the soldiers had to learn the alphabet in six
month, or else they could not leave the barracks until they mastered writing. 37 Pibun also
believed that ideas of National Socialism and Fascism would well suit Thai society. The
strong individual leadership of Mussolini and Hitler clearly inspired him.38 Pibun's
militaristic tendencies surfaced in 1935 when he organized several youth corps, called

yuwachon, emulating the Hitler Jugend. 39 "The process was equal to propagating

32 Ray, 196; Thamsook, Thailand, 26.
33 Harvey W. Smith and others. Area Handbook/or Thai/and(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 1968), 77.
34 Thamsook, "Pibulsongkram's," 245.
35 Ibid., 243.
36 Ibid., 245.
37 Ray, 198.
38 Thamsook, "Pibulsongkram 's," 243.
39 Smith and others, 247.
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militarism, dictatorship, and Pibun's influence among the young."40 Pibun' s efforts to
shape public opinion included his articles published by newspapers, and radio addresses.
He frequently censored the mass media through his additional cabinet position as
Minister oflnterior. 41
Thai nationalism was deliberately promoted by popularizing traditional Thai
songs, plays, and literature. 42 The memories of national heroes of ancient times were
revived to boost the handy ideology. To further spread Thai traditional culture, Pibun
used a lively folk dance called ramwong. Radio Thailand broadcast its tune every day,
and all government offices had to play it so that their employees could practice dancing .43
Under Pibun Songkram, the pro-Japanese dictator, the name of the country
was changed to Thailand and, with a heady mix of nationalism and militarism, a
'Pan-Thai' movement was launched, the object of which was to unite all the Thai
peoples in Burma and Indochina. 44
The abundant propaganda directed to the "Thai brothers" in Laos and Cambodia found
some positive reaction, particularly in southern Laos.

The Dispute over Indo-China
Perhaps the most popular of Pi bun's nationalistic appeals was his call for a greater
Thailand. The first publicly voiced Pan-Thai ideas could be traced to 1934. A year later
they appeared in the Assembly. In 1936, the government popularized maps of historical
Siam at its maximum territorial holding. Pibun and his lieutenant responsible for
propaganda were determined to lead the irredenta. The expansion took place at the
expense of the French Indo-China in 1941 . After a brief military clash with the French

40 Thamsook, "Pibulsongkram's," 243.
41 Ibid., 234.
42 Sakdi Rattanachai, interview, 14 July 1998.
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forces in lndo-China, followed by Japanese mediation, Thailand gained the Laotian
territories of Sayaboury and Champasak and the Cambodian land of Siemreap and
Battambang except for the ancient city of Angkor and adjacent lands. "Such 'territorial
conquest' led the Thai to believe that Pi bun was a person with extraordinary power who
could lead the country in times of crises. "45 "It is no exaggeration to say that this
expansion policy was accepted virtually unanimously, and mobilized the vast majority of
people behind the regime."46 Pibun's military rank was Major General, which in the
natural course would have been followed by Lieutenant General and General. Pibun
played the conflict into his image building campaign as well. Following the Thai
expansion, he promoted himself directly to the rank of Field Marshal.
Pibun's later commitments to Japan and the complex relations between Thailand
and Japan in the 1940s cannot be fully explained without an analysis of the Franco-Thai
confrontation over Indo-China. The border dispute between Thailand and the French in
lndo-China can be traced to a treaty of 1893 between the two parties, which gave France
areas on the left bank of the Mekong river (Laos) and many islands in the river.
Additionally, Thailand was not allowed to erect military structures in the twenty-five
kilometer wide zone along the Mekong. In 1904, Thailand was forced to make
subsequent concessions to France. They included the cession of two enclaves on the right
bank of the Mekong, one opposite Luang Prabang, and one opposite Pakse. The latter
cessions inhibited Thai use of the river. The situation was further complicated by not
employing the principle ofthalweg' and ambiguous wording of the 1883 treaty. 47 Thus,

43 Thamsook, Thailand, 38.
44 Geoffrey Gunn, Political Struggles in Laos (1930- 1954) (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamal, Thailand, 1988), 99.
45 Thamsook, "Pibulsongkram 's," 245.
46 Charnvit, 46.
• Thalweg--a line that connects the lowest points in a riverbed.
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through the expansion of colonial France, Thailand lost a large portion of its territory, the
free use of the Mekong, and the natural geographical border with its neighbor.
The Thai situation improved after World War I. Emerging on the victorious side
as an ally of France, it received a sympathetic reception of its request for revising the
border issues. A special convention applied the thalweg to determine the border on the
Mekong except in places where the border was to be between the French islands and the
Thai bank. France also agreed to a twenty-five kilometer zone with no military structures
mirroring the one on Thai side. The Thais remained disappointed with not setting the
thalweg as the border, and with French persistence in holding the right-bank enclaves. On
those matters, France was never willing to make any concessions despite Thailand' s
frequent efforts to modify the border. 48
From 1926 to 1939, no progress was made on revising the treaty. In 1936, when
Thailand was negotiating new, equal treaties with foreign powers, the French side ignored
the border question as a demonstration of "Siamese imperialism."49 In 1939, however, as
France began to feel less secure due to the growing tension in Europe and particularly the
rapprochement of Germany and the Soviet Union at the expense of Poland, a French
representative approached Pibun to request a non-aggression pact. The Thai response,
although reluctant, was favorable, but insisted on the revision of borders as a
precondition. The French side, or at least the special French representative -- Paul
Lepissier, agreed to the negotiating of the border problems in October 1939. Although
Lepissier enjoyed the support of Georges Mandel, in charge of the French colonial affairs
until May 19, 1940, the officials governing Indo-China remained adamantly opposed to

47 Thadeus E. Flood, "Franco-Thai Border Dispute and Phibun Songkhram 's Commitment to Japan," Journal of
Southeast Asian History (September 1969): 305.
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any concessions to Thailand. Despite this, individual colonies, such as lndo-China could
not independently engage in diplomatic dealings.
The non-aggression pact France desired was signed in Bangkok on June 12, 1940.
Pibun's address on that occasion was included in the Bangkok Chronicle of that day:
I desire to affirm that the honour which the Government of the Republic
offers us today will remain deeply rooted in the hearts of the Thai people, and will
constitute clear evidence that there will be no change in the traditional friendship
between Thailand and the French Republic.
Secret annexes to the pact established that the border between Thailand and the French
Indo-China would be based on the principle ofthalweg and provided for a high-ranking
negotiator on the French side to further discuss border issues prior to the ratification of

.

the pact. Meanwhile, Germany had invaded France, and paralyzed French diplomacy .
Instead of a negotiator from Paris, French officials from lndo-China were appointed to
settle the issue. In the new environment, conservative colonial officials refused to
consider any concessions.
Pibun notified Japan and Great Britain about the ongoing negotiations in the fall
of 193 9. The Japanese pressure was mounting in the region and the fall of Paris further
destabilized the situation in the lndo-China. Pibun, influenced by his close friend,
Japanese military attache Colonel Hiroshi Tamura, believed that Japan would be true to
its pan-Asian slogans and would soon overtake French lndo-China. The Bangkok

Chronicle of June 20, 1940 reported that Japan requested the other Axis powers to
recognize its dominance over the former French colony. Heading the widely supported
irredentist movement, Pibun had to ensure that Japan would not take the territories under

48 Ibid., 306.
49 Ibid.
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Franco-Thai dispute. The French side lost the sense of urgency and its strong motivation
to settle the issue. It merely asked to ratify the treaty with no further negotiations.
Pibun desired to take a firmer stand in the disagreement. To strengthen his
position he had to rely on Japan-the emerging dominant power in the region. The
importance of Japan in Southeast Asia grew as Germany continued its phenomenal
successes in Europe. Following a leakage of diplomatic information from the Thai
foreign affairs ministry to the West regarding Japanese request of Thailand to recognize
Manchukuo, Pibun began to handle dealings with the Japanese diplomats personally. 50
As Pibun's involvement with Japan increased, he decided to send a good will
mission to Japan in the fall of 1940, headed by Colonel Prom Yodhi, Vice Minister of
Defense. The purpose of the mission was to give young officers some exposure to Japan
and to influence the traditionally pro-Western Prom Yodhi. 51 Probably the chief objective
of the mission was, however, to secure Japanese backing for Thai irredenta, despite
official claims that territorial enlargement was not a priority for Bangkok. 52 The sense of
urgency grew as the Thai, as well as the French in Indo-China, were expecting a Japanese
attack on the French colony. Thailand probed Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the US
concerning their claims in Indo-China. The Axis powers fully supported the claims, while
the United States and Britain called for a peaceful settlement. The United States shortly
thereafter imposed an embargo on a shipment of planes already paid for by Thailand.
Intending to benefit from this opportunity, Japan provided Thailand with the needed
planes and ammunition.

50 Batson and Shimizu, 44.
51 Flood, "Franco, 3 13 .
52 Frederick Dolbeare-an adviser to the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Bangkok Chronicle August 19,
1940, stated that the Thai government was interested in the internal development of Thailand rather than territorial
expansion.
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The Japanese attitude towards Thailand varied among different political circles.
As early as 1938, Emperor Showa clearly demanded of military commanders that they
must have the Thai government's approval before commencing any military movements
on Thai territory. The navy, while longing for a southern expansion, remained careful in
realizing its ambitions, fearing a confrontation with the United States. The army, having
decided on southern expansion, sought a way to assure Thai cooperation necessary to
invade Burma and Malaya. As a result of the intense interest in Thailand, more Japanese
intelligence forces were sent to Bangkok; Tamura and Asada were charged with leading
Pibun into an alliance with Japan. The growing irredentist movement in Thailand proved
a great opportunity for Japan to secure Thai pledges of support.
The new Tliai-Japanese friendship treaty of June 12, 1940 fulfilled the Japanese
desire to become more influential in Southeast Asia, and the Thai need for strong support
in its irredenta. The document consisted of three major points. It confirmed the existing
cordial relations and mutually pledged respect for the other party's territorial integrity.
The parties agreed to share information and discuss mutually important issues. Lastly, "In
the event of one of the High Contracting Parties suffering an attack from any third Power
or Powers, the other Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance to the said Power or
Powers against the Party attacked. "53
In August 1940, Asada approached Pibun to intensify Thai economic relations
with new members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, raising the Thai-Japanese diplomatic
relations to an ambassadorial level, signing a Japan-Thai cultural agreement, and
recognition of Manchukuo. Pibun replied favorably to the request, yet he did not act on
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the verbal approval until a year later. Thus, Pibun's pro-Japanese predisposition became
questionable. 54 Even more so, because of the message carried by Prom Yodhi to the
French officials in Hanoi on his way to Tokyo. He proposed an alliance between Thailand
and Indo-China against Japan in exchange for the enclaves of land on the right bank of
the Mekong. The French, determined not to make any further concessions, refused the
offer. In response, Pibun announced that, unlike the pact with Britain ratified on August
31, the non-aggression pact with France would not be ratified unless France made
concessions on the territorial issues. Thai demands included the return of Lao states and
lands opposite of Pakse and Luang Prabang and setting a border in accordance with the
deep channel water. ss Pi bun represented the demand for Lao states as an unwanted

a

expansion, merely move necessary to protect the Thai people living on that area. The
Bangkok Chronicle editorial from October 20, 1940 referred to the natives of Laos: "They
are Thai people, a few millions of them, who are ever so eager to rejoin their brethren." 56
The subsequent talks and diplomatic correspondence that occurred between
Bangkok and Hanoi proved futile, as the French conservatives ascended in power and
Lepissier became less influential. The French would not compromise. Instead, they
sought a quick, unconditional ratification of the pact. In response to the adamant French
position, Pibun, determined to lead the irredenta to a successful conclusion, indirectly
approached the Japanese naval attache Commander Torigoe Shinichi. Wanit delivered the
pro-Japanese commitment. As Pibun confirmed in person on October 1, 1940, Japan
would receive the right of troops' passage through Thailand, supplies, and raw materials.
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The implied consideration was the Japanese support of Thai expansion. 57
Thus, Pi bun was determined to recover the historically Thai territory at any price.
As Pibun was quoted in Kamon Pensrinokun:
... you might wonder how this border adjustment can be successfully
achieved after we received only denials in our talks with the French both times. I
would like to explain to you that we have at our disposal several other means
which [I] need to reserve as the tool of this government in achieving this goal ... 58
Despite his status as the leader of a notorious pro-Japanese faction, Pibun sought support
in the West. 59 When it failed, he turned to Japan.
Pibun was a cautious man and was no doubt loath to enter into the secret
verbal understanding with the Japanese that he actually did. Yet, in his eyes, the
only alternative would be the abandonment of the claims on the Mekong that he
earlier believed could be realized easily. This would in turn cause him a loss of
face among his countrymen, and there were domestic political rivals waiting to
take advantage of such opportunity." 60

.

The Thai press successfully helped in spreading anti-French sentiment. November
headlines of the Bangkok Chronicle included the following: "French Drive against
Thailand Reviewed," or "Further Violations of Thai Sovereignty." The paper reported
about ill-treatment of the native population and priests in Laos as well as about several
anti-French parades and demonstrations of thousands of people organized by the "Thai
Blood Party."61
The first major military clashes occurred in early December 1940. Thai planes
bombed Indo-China: Vientiane, the Saravane region, Pakse, and Savannakhet. The
French air force bombed Thailand: Udon, Sakhone, and Ubon. Following minor clashes,
the ground operations intensified in January 1941. In Cambodia, they included Thai
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artillery bombardment. While the Thai army was victorious, the French navy defeated
Thai forces in the Gulf of Siam on January 17, 1941.
Japan's promotion of Asian interests proved to be as insincere as Pibun's proJapanese sympathies he had expressed. As Thailand and lndo-China became exhausted
with the war effort, Japan stepped in as a mediator. The cease-fire went into effect on
January 28, 1941; after lengthy negotiations the treaty of May 9, 1941 signed in Tokyo
provided for a retrocession of the lands Thailand lost to France in 1904 and 1907, but it
also allowed France to retain a few islets on the Mekong. The treaty gave Thailand some
70,000 square kilometers of area forested with precious teak, but it also committed Pi bun
to the Co-Prosperity Sphere.62 The mediation was an insulting loss to Francesupposedly some French diplomats remarked at the time that the settlement would not
last long. At the same time, the limited gains deeply disappointed Thailand. Many were
unaware of the extent of the naval defeat and demanded greater gains. Thailand not only
had to agree to a demilitarized zone along the border, but it also had to pay to France
money represented as compensation for capital improvements.63 Japan clearly benefited
from the arrangement, gaining prestige and Thai commitments. Pibun also gained.
Through his maneuvering, the dispute that was supposed to lead to a non-aggression pact
became a military conflict. Because of this, he saved face, gained popularity, and not only
retained his position, but promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal.

The Coming of War
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The Indo-China dispute was one reason why Japan and Thailand drew closer
together. The war in Europe weakened trade with the belligerent countries, leading to
growing Thai dependence on exchange with Japan. 64 Despite Thailand's growing
dependence on Japan, neutrality remained the official Thai policy. In the words of Pibun
quoted in the Bangkok Chronicle of June 8, 1940:
Whatever the trend of the war in Europe and whatever the nature of its
repercussions abroad, Thailand is firmly determined to pursue her policy of strict
and impartial neutrality as hitherto.6s
When Thailand signed pacts of non-aggression on June 12, 1940, in contrast to the pacts
with Britain and France, the agreement with Japan concerned "the continuance of friendly
relations and mutual respect for each other' s territorial integrity" rather than being limited
to a non-aggression clause. 66
The cultural ties included Thai youth studying at Japanese universities. As of the
summer of 1940, there were about 115 Thai students in Tokyo at that time.67 An
increasing amount of the news presented by Thai newspapers came from Axis news
agencies like Domei or Trans-Ocean, replacing the BBC and Reuters. Thailand and its
Prime Minister received favorable press in Japan (notably, in the Osaka Mainichi, but
also in the Japan Times). Reciprocally, Thai newspapers wrote about Japanese actions
like the "China Incident" in very careful terms.63
Thailand's foreign trade with Japan went through three distinct stages. The first
began with the opening of the Yokohama Specie Bank's branch in Bangkok. This period
of slowly growing exchange ended with the China Incident. In the second stage, Thai
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trade, largely controlled by Chinese merchants, excluded Japanese products due to
Japan's aggression. The beginning of World War II started the third era of Thai-Japanese
trade. With the belligerent nations unable to sustain production and shipping, Thailand
turned to the neutral nations i.e. the United States and Japan, as well as British colonies
(mainly Hongkong). 69
The economic ties within the Co-Prosperity Sphere strengthened, as it became
increasingly difficult for its members to trade with the Allies. Although in 1939 Japan
was a net exporter to Thailand (exports exceed imports little less than five times),
Japanese demand for Thai rice, timber, rubber, ferrous ores, and tin greatly increased due
to the war conditions of the Japanese economy. In July 1941 , Japan requested a 10
million baht loan to finance its purchases. Thailand granted the loan, however, on the
condition that the Japanese repay in gold. Pibun was hesitant to lend the money, fearing
inflation, but the completion of rice sales to Japan depended on the loan. The money
lasted until another request in August, this time for 25 million baht. Thailand granted this
loan too, on the condition that all of the gold backing up the loan except for 10 million,
baht would be kept in Bangkok. Thailand depended on supplies of oil from Japan,
shipments of which were conditional on Thai supplies of tin and rubber.
Two events on the global arena proved crucial for the Thai future. In April 1941,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact, which significantly eased tensions on
Japan' s northern borders; in June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Due to the
latter, Japan could put more trust into the recently signed pact. With the Soviet Union
engaged in the European conflict, Japan could safely pursue its southern expansion.

69 Bangkok Chronicle, July 17, 1940.
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As Japan established its control over lndo-China, it intensified its attempts to
persuade Thailand into military cooperation. Despite the commitment to support Japan
made in September 1940, Pibun, probably disappointed with the Japanese mediation,
turned once again to the West for weapons and assistance. However, the Western
response was very limited. The United States since the Franco-Thai conflict, the United
States viewed Thailand with deep distrust. Its pledge of help to Thailand was limited to
an insignificant supply of arms. Great Britain at that time was in no position to protect
anyone. However, in November, Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister to Thailand,
mentioned some field guns, howitzers, and ammunition in Singapore on which Thailand
could possibly count. Crosby had always been sympathetic towards Thailand;
notwithstanding, ai the time instead of defending Thailand, Great Britain was considering
operation "Matador:" a military action to secure Thai areas necessary for the defense of
Singapore. In all, the Western powers promised Thailand nothing binding.
In July 1941, Japan requested of Thailand a diplomatic upgrade from Ministers to
Ambassadors. The exchange took place in October 1941 . For the Japanese, it provided a
chance to increase the number of personnel deployed for infiltration, while Pibun could
eliminate one of his opponents, Sri Sena, by sending him to Tokyo. The Thai minister of
foreign affairs, Direk Chayanam, turned to the United States and Great Britain with a
proposal of similar exchange. Both refused citing as reasons principles unrelated to
Thailand-one had a policy not to do such things while at war, and the other had refused
to grant the request to other countries, thus it could not grant it to Thailand. Another
diplomatic request Japan made of Thailand concerned the recognition ofManchukuo and
Nanking. Thailand recognized the first while refusing to recognize the second.
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Pibun, while double-dealing and trying to secure favors from the Allies and from
Japan, officially maintained that Thailand continued the strict neutrality policy as
outlined in the Royal Proclamation of September 5, 1939 (countersigned by the Prime
Minister). On August 21, his lieutenant, Wichit Wichitwathakan, released a statement
about Thai neutrality. On September 8, The Duty of the Thai People During War Act was
released:
All Thai people must resist the enemy in every way with weapon supply,
monetary supply, and other supplies(... ) all Thai people must resist the force of
the enemy in ways possible until the end. (... )They must also destroy tools,
equipment, household supply, consumption supply, houses, living quarters, beast
of burden, and other supplies. 10
In the same spirit, Pi bun told a British agent, on October 3, 1941, that Thailand would
resist Japan vigorously and cooperate with Great Britain.11
In the fall of 1941, Japanese diplomats several times urged Pibun to cooperate
more closely with Japan. However, he managed to avoid further commitments. At the
same time, Japan, foreseeing an unnecessarily strenuous campaign against Burma and
Malaya in case of Thai alienation, was careful not to press its demands too bluntly. In
November, tension between Japan and the United States reflected on the situation in
Thailand, where a newly established defense command called Thai military reserves. 72
The press reflected the general state of unrest among the people facing uncertain future. 73
On November 5, 1941 , Hideki Tojo reported on the forum of the Imperial Conference
that "we have been working on Pibun Songkram to set up close military relations ever
since the time of our advance into Southern French Indo-China." However, he had no
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certainty as to the outcome of the Japanese advances. 74 Later that month, Tsubokami
Teiji, the newly arrived Japanese ambassador, approached Pibun to discuss transit of
troops through Thailand. Pibun pledged economic cooperation and was generally
sympathetic towards Japan throughout the meeting. 75 Although his inclinations seemed
pro-Japanese (particularly his opinion presented during the November 28, Cabinet
meeting), Pibun had not made a decision. 76 Thus, Tojo stated on December 1, that
Thailand's alignment could not be foreseen. 77
On December 3, in a three-hour speech to the cabinet, Pibun declared "The time
has come when we must cast our fate with that of Japan."78 As the Thai cabinet was
debating which course to take in the approaching conflict, Asada brought from Tokyo a
document outlining the actions to be taken by the Japanese diplomats on the day prior to
the troops' entry. The date was to be specified later. 79 Pibun received a warning that the
attack had been scheduled for December 3, but was postponed for a few days. On
December 4, Tamura asked once more about possible military cooperation. While Pibun
appeared closer to an agreement than previously, on the same day he dispatched a note
addressed to Churchill asking for an official statement that a Japanese aggression on
Thailand would put Great Britain in a state of war with Japan. 80 The December 5 Bangkok
Chronicle presented news supplied by BBC and Reuters about the powerful British fleet
headed by HMS Prince of Wales and slowing Japanese offensive actions. The press at
that time portrayed both powers as matched opponents. The same issue brought an
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interview with Pibun in which he said that Thailand, if forced to, would fight to the very
end. He confirmed the policy of strict neutrality and declared that Thailand was safe
unless the great powers "consider [the recently ratified] sacred treaties as scraps of
paper." "Honour is our life and soul," he stated. 81

The War
Pibun was absent from Bangkok on the critical night of December 7. There are at
least two different explanations given by Pibun for his sudden departure. 82 Whether he
went away to investigate an unjust imprisonment of a minor official or to inspect defense
posts, both seem mere pretexts. It remains undetermined whether he purposely left

.

Bangkok in the crucial time so as to defer the decision. Asada, who was charged with
delivering the Japanese requests, wrote in his diary "Inferring a possible Japanese military
move, he temporarily evaded talks with Japan... "83 A very plausible explanation comes
from another source:
The Japanese were going to war. It was now a matter of how quickly and
strongly the British would react. If they were able to cope with the Japanese, the
old order could remain intact. Thus a commitment too early to Japan could expose
Pibun's anti-British stance which might easily lead to his downfall. [ ... ] Ifhe
remained in Bangkok, Pibun would be forced at the very start, before events had
developed at all, to reveal his commitment. If he were "out of reach," however, he
could delay this commitment and perhaps have a chance to grasp the development
of events. 84
On the evening of December 7, at 10:30 P.M., Teiji Tsubokami asked to see the Prime
Minister. Since Pibun was absent, Tsubokami informed the cabinet that on the next day
by 2:30 A.M., the Imperial Army would enter Thailand for the purpose of attacking
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Burma and Malaya, and requested permission and facilitation oftransit. 85 No delay was
possible after the simultaneous strike against Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and Malaya had
been initiated. The cabinet members replied that since Thailand was under martial law,
only Pibun had the power to make the decision. 86
Pibun returned to Bangkok just before 7 A.M. Meanwhile the troops and police
stationed on the borders fiercely resisted. Thai troops fought with bare hands, for there
was virtually no ammunition for any sustained fighting. It was a small event in the scope
of what was to follow on a world-wide scale, but it was deadly real to those who fought
there ....87 Once again, Pibun won through his political maneuvers. He gained precious
hours during which he could make the decision most benefiting him. During the Cabinet
meeting he hypocritically cut short Pridi by saying that there was no time for lengthy
discussion while Thai soldiers were dying. The delay was a result of Pibun's concern for
his political standing in the frrst place. 88 The "deadly real" price was paid by the soldiers,
police, and civilians who, whether out of patriotism or at the gunpoint of their superiors,
followed Pibun's words about "resistance to the end." That he did not believe in the
policy himself was proved by the disorganized defense to which Thai resistance
amounted. While foreseeing a Japanese military move, he did not dispatch troops to the
likely invasion points. 89
At 7:30 A.M. the cabinet reached a consensus to declare a cease-fire. Pibun
delivered the news to the waiting Japanese and returned to the meeting with the Japanese
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offer, which consisted of four proposed courses of action Thailand could take: 1. A ThaiJapanese offensive/defensive alliance, 2. Joining the Axis, 3. Cooperation with Japanese
military operations, 4. Mutual defense of Thailand which would include Thailand's
participation in the Tripartite Pact, and an offensive/defensive bilateral treaty with
Japan. 90 A cease-fue and transit of Japanese troops was a part of each option, as well as a
promise to aid Thailand in recovery of some Malayan and Burmese territories.91
Further Cabinet discussion yielded a decision to allow Japanese transit, avoid
military cooperation with the Imperial Army, and refuse the lost territories from Japanese
hands. A treaty to that effect was signed at 11 :25. The first signed agreement, as
presented by the Bangkok Chronicle of December 9, 1941, provided for allowing of the
troops' transit in exchange of Japan's recognition of Thai sovereignty, independence, and
national honor. The first clause of the treaty further stipulated that Thailand would
provide "all convenience necessary for this passage. " 92 The decision seemed justified by
the circumstances as they appeared to Pibun: five hundred Japanese planes were allegedly
ready to bomb Bangkok, three Japanese convoys of warships blockaded Thailand, no
dependable external help was immediately forthcoming, the country would be destroyed
in the course of war, and lastly, the army would be disarmed and Thailand would be
occupied by the Japanese. 93 Pibun's wife, Lady La-lad, speaking for Pibun, explained all
subsequently made agreements by simply saying, "There was no choice for a small, weak
country deprived of any support of a Big Power." 94 It seems, however, that there were
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other options, only maybe not as appealing to Pibun due to the political risk he would
face from even a remote danger of disarming the Thai army. Furthermore, Pibun might
have had already resolved by that time to join the Japanese bandwagon. Asada recalled
that shortly after the agreement on the least cooperative option of passage was reached by
dolorous Thai ministers, Wanit came to his office radiating with joy and ambiguously
promised to the perplexed diplomat that "Everything is O.K. Step by step." 95 It must be
noted that as early as December 3, Wanit expressed his hope that Thailand would
cooperate with Japan. 96 Whereas Wanit could possibly act on his own initiative, Pibun
would soon directly undertake steps towards an alliance.
On December 10, at a meeting with the Thai Cabinet, Pibun spoke of Japan in
favorable terms.

He noted that Japan posed a danger, but advocated cooperation.

97

This

new attitude differed considerably from his remarks on December 8. Later the same day,
Pibun arranged a meeting with Tsubokami. The ambassador brought to the meeting a
draft of an alliance treaty expecting Pibun to seek closer ties. Indeed, at the meeting
Pibun announced that he would enforce martial law, reshuffle the cabinet, and after the
people were prepared, he would declare war on Britain. 98 When approached with the draft
treaty, Pibun promised to sign it the next day. The Bangkok Chronicle for that day
reported the sinking of the formidable HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. 99 The
strike clearly pointed to Japan as the likely victor. Pibun's radio address from the last
night followed the proclamation of the martial law. The Prime Minister announced: "May
I state on oath that, however serious the situation of the country, I shall not resign my
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post as Premier and shall serve the Nation to the last." On the abandonment of the policy
of"fighting to the very end" he remarked "The policy of the Nation has changed
somewhat and the people ought to behave themselves accordingly." 100
The relations with Great Britain at the time were defined by the non-aggression
pact of June 12, 1940, later ratified in Bangkok. Article 2 of the pact provided the
following:
If one of the High Contracting Parties is the object of an act of war or of
aggression on the part of one, or more than one, third Power, the other High
Contracting Party undertakes not to give, either directly or indirectly, aid or
assistance to the aggressor or aggressors for the duration of the present Treaty. 101

The treaty was to be valid for at least six years.
At the December 11 Cabinet meeting, Pibun informed the ministers that the

.

Japanese were pressing for the next step and that they would resort to force if their
demands were not met. Although Asada recalled in his memoirs that he had been
surprised by the development, 102 Pibun presented the closer cooperation as a solely
Japanese idea, and magnified the threat of a forceful military invasion to conclude that
whoever acted violently against the Japanese, in effect betrayed Thailand. 103 Pibun used
the Japanese threat to pressure the cabinet into approving the treaty and accepting his
unofficial pro-Japanese inclination. The draft was signed that day. The Bangkok

Chronicle of December 12, 1941 reported the news as a development that would "add
glorious pages to the history of Thailand as well as Japan." It presented the Japanese
aggression as an act of self-defense and triumphantly announced that "While the parleys
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have been used to deceive other races for the cause of their existence, their fate is now
sealed; the Asiatic race subjected to pressure for hundreds of years have now risen up." 104
On December 15, Pibun assumed the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries. He
transferred Direk Chayanam from the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the post
of Ambassador to Japan, thus giving himself a free hand in Thai foreign policy. The
Bangkok Chronicle for that day reported about several Japanese successes and a clash
between Thai and British troops on the Burmese border on December 12. Another article
described the people's reaction to the new treaty:
Public sentiment in Thailand underwent an absolute change yesterday,
when the entire Thai Nation, at the request of the Government, united in
celebrating the conclusion of the Nippon-Thai Offensive and Defensive Alliance.
True to their traditional warrior spirit, the Thai people were not in the least degree
scared at tlie prospects of war but on the contrary rejoiced because they know that
they had been accorded their due share in the creation of a New Order in East
Asia[...] Never before was the warmth of friendship between the Thai and
Japanese peoples felt so keenly .... 105
Thus, among "peace loving" Thai, the martial spirit suddenly revived. Both Britain and
Japan were viewed as neutral powers until December 8; then, the Japanese became the
invaders. One week later, the friendship with the Japanese was "everlasting," while the
British were referred to as the "enemy." The changes in the language employed by
Bangkok Chronic/e-{:,ensored by the government as all other press, well illustrate the
change in Thai foreign policy. The swift change of friends and enemies could well inspire
George Orwell. Pibun was a true dictator.
Some of his decisions could be explained by duress caused by the Japanese
presence. Pibun later spoke:
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... if the people were to know of the pressure which the Japanese exerted in
forcing me to join in the defensive and offensive treaty ... I am sure they will fully
sympathize with me and my government. It would take too long to relate the story
in full, allow me therefore to point out briefly that I tried to argue and stubbornly
refused to do anything till I got a headache. The Japanese who packed my
residence at each occasion comprised of military officers as well as diplomats, all
of them screamed to have their demands carried out." 106
However, it must be remembered that Pibun himself arranged the crucial meeting with
Tsubokami on December 10. The treaty of December 12, or certainly the declaration of
war, was a choice Pibun made freely, for the purpose of advancing his interests.
On December 17, Pridi's promotion to the regent's council was announced. The
promotion would strengthen Pibun's position in the Cabinet which Pridi was forced to
leave. Also, Vilas Osthanom, a minister without portfolio and the Director General of
Public Relations Department, a supporter of Pridi, had to leave their posts. 107 On
December 18, one of the most pro-Japanese politicians, Wanit Pananon assumed the
position of Minister of Finance concurrently with Phra Boriphan. 108
Pibun declared his commitment to the new treaty:
As this Pact of Alliance is a sacred document, arrangements have been
made for its formal signature to take place in this sacred temple, and I pray that,
by virtue of the Triple Gems, our two allied countries may be blessed with the
successful and fruitful achievements of our aspirations for the peace and
prosperity of East Asia. 109

The unusual setting of the signing ceremony was supposed to indicate how
earnest Pibun was. In retrospection, it only proved that nothing was sacred for him. In his
explanation of wartime actions Pibun wrote after the war: "Considering the fact that I and
the government headed by me led our country to fight on the side of Japan, it is clear that
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we did not have any intention of earnestly doing so." 110 Ironically, Pibun sacrilegiously
mentioned the Triple Gems once again, after the war. He wrote:
Some propaganda pieces accused me of concluding a secret treaty with
Japan as a war ally before Japan entered Thailand. For this, I would like the Triple
Gems to bear me witness that I have never committed such an act. 11 1
Here, he chose not to recall the day when he gave his word to Torigoe in October J 940, to
which he later referred during the war:
Yes, I remember that day very clearly. I did my best to abide by that
promise( ... ) I would like to go hand in hand with you, Captain Torigoe, up the
same road. Let us exert our best efforts for Asia. 112
On December 11 , Pibun also invoked his Buddhist values. He spoke of the
Japanese: "They want us to help them fight, and if they don't give us anything, then that' s
our [bad] karma."' r.i It was ominous for Thailand that its leader would not take the
responsibility for negative outcomes, but blame them on bad karma instead.
The Pact of Alliance of December 21 consisted of three points: both countries
were to respect each other's independence and sovereignty, they were to extend mutual
aid if one of the parties were in conflict with a third party, and neither party could enter a
peace agreement without the other party's consent. 114 The secret protocol provided for
return to Thailand of the lands it had had to cede and for immediate Thai help in the
Japanese war effort. Lastly, the new agreement superseded the one of December 8. The
Assembly enthusiastically received the treaty at its secret session on December 23,
because of its support for the clause about recovering territories.
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On January 25, at 10 A.M. the cabinet decided to declare war on the United States
and Britain. The decision followed what the January 26 Straits Times described as a
"highly successful low-level attack on the power station and other targets in Bangkok" by
heavy R.A.F. bombers; it was the second raid in that month. The Declaration of War
read:
Whereas Great Britain and the United States of America have committed
successive acts of aggression against Thailand, in certain cases by sending troops
to invade Thai territory and, in particular, by sending aeroplanes clandestinely to
bomb the homes of the people who carry on their normal livelihood ... so that
Thailand can no longer look on with forbearance, ... now therefore ... it is hereby
declared by Royal Command that a state of war exists between Thailand on the
one hand, and Great Britain and the United States of America, on the other hand,
as from noon of the 25th of January B.E. 2485 [1942]. .. 115

All twenty-four millisters present assented to it; so did two of the three regents (Pridi was
absent at the time). At noon the decision was broadcast to the people. December 29
brought the Assembly' s approval of the declaration of war. The declaration was merely a
diplomatic confirmation of the previous developments in Thai-Japanese relations. In fact,
the Thais had already been fighting at Japan's side in accordance with the Alliance
Treaty.
On January 26, Tsubokami congratulated Pibun on the decision to enter the war.
The Emperor awarded him the highest order of the Empire.116 Despite an isolated opinion
that the decision came as a surprise to the Japanese, an unwelcome one since it enabled
Britain to attack freely the troops stationed in Thailand without considering the natives,
Japan had clearly planned on directly involving Thailand in the war. 117

11 5 Ibid., 457.
1 I 6 Swan, "Thai-Japanese," 29 1.
11 7 Inoue, 57.
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The Allied reaction was decidedly unfavorable. Seni Pramoj , the Minister to the
United States at that time, refused to deliver the declaration since there was no causus

belli. Washington decided not to reciprocate or even recognize the declaration of war, and
maintained the decision until the end of the war. Britain was very disappointed with Thai
actions since December 8. However, its precautionary strengthening of defenses in
Malaya began as early as July 2. 118 On December 17, a British Foreign Office
commentator had stated that declaration of war on Thailand "was obviously on the
cards," in a front page article titled "War Declaration Against Thais?" 119 On December
22, 1941 the same newspaper informed about the Thai-Japanese mutual, offensivedefensive alliance with the comment:
It is now evident that Field Marshal Luang Pibun Songkram, the Prime
Minister of Thailand, was flirting with Japan for an alliance even at the time when
he declared that Thailand would defend her country to the end against
aggression. 120

Thus, the tone of the Straits Times of January 26, 1942 announcement about the
declaration of war did not convey any surprise. Crosby recalled Thai pledges to remain
neutral at all costs and called the declaration a most shameful document in Thai
diplomatic history. Churchill reciprocated the declaration of war and used it as
justification to occupy Thailand at the end of the war.
Pibun suppressed any opposition to the alliance. He imprisoned twelve journalists,
of whom two were sentenced for life. The state of war further strengthened his dictatorial
power. He delayed the date of the 1942 Assembly elections by two years to maintain his
strongholds there. Pibun swiftly accumulated ministerial portfolios. By February 16,

118 Bangkok Chronicle, July 2, 1940.
119 Straits Times, December 17, 1941.
120 Ibid .. December 22, 1941.
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1942 he was the Minister of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Education
simultaneously. The military power he wielded was of Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Commander of the Navy, Commander of the Air Force, and Supreme Commander of
Armed Forces. 12 1 In addition to the key portfolios held by Pibun, he manipulated the
Cabinet members according to his will. As Thawee recalls:
The way Pibun consulted his colleagues smacked of full-blasted
authoritarianism. Usually a Prime Minister in a constitutional regime is expected
to ascertain the views of his colleagues, then offer his own, on a particular subject,
and try to arrive at a final decision. But Pibun (while in a meeting) would talk and
talk, trying as it were to make others chew his views, and then ask what views
others held. By that time others had lost all appetite for a healthy debate.
Moreover, any expression of a difference of opinion was dangerous and
sometimes likely to draw retaliation, especially from the police.122

.

Thawee also documented how Pibun threatened him with prison and later offered him a
bribe not to become the Speaker of the house. 123
After the war, Pibun denied any dictatorial ambitions. As he put it:
What is dictatorship? Ifl am alleged to imitate fascist Mussolini or Hitler,
I swear I have never had even the least thought.
Is there any Dictator who upholds democracy as much as myself? It is me
who built Democracy Monument. It is me who constructed Democracy Avenue. It
is me who ordered citations of constitution on the air every night. It is me again
who minted Democracy coins.
I am not a dictator. A dictator must be much more ruthless. A kind-hearted
one like myself can never be a dictator. 124
Such was Pibun's position officially accepted after the war; apparently it was convincing
enough to allow him to lead Thai politics once more with Western backing. Yet, this
opinion calls for scrutinizing it once more. In the light of various sources this paper will

121 Foran Songsri, Thai-British-American Relations during World War II and the Immediate Postwar Period, 19401946 (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1985), 26.
122 Ray, 76
123 Ibid., 97
124 Thamsook, " Pibulsongkram's," 242
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demonstrate that Pibun desired nothing less than a dictatorship and the interest of (as he
had declared) beloved Thailand, was not closer to him than his political power.

Pi bun's Motives
What caused Pibun to make the decision? When did his attitude change to
decidedly favor Japan? Answering these questions seems impossible. The only available
clues are Pibun's words. But, whether they appeared in diplomatic talks, a formal treaty, a
political speech, or an address to the Cabinet, Pi bun himself never regarded them as
meaningful. Moreover, despite his name being commonly associated with the proJapanese faction, it seems he never had a principle-based attitude towards Japan.
He was clearly convinced that the Japanese would emerge victorious:
The British have already lost the War and I am convinced that the
Japanese will defeat the British very soon in every theatre of war in Asia. ( ... ]
There is not the slightest indication that the British could win the war. I am of the
opinion that the Japanese will undoubtedly defeat the British very soon in all
theatres of war in Asia. [ ... ] And, if I am wrong in this viewpoint, I bet you a
dozen bottles of champagne. 125
Pibun's confidence in Japanese victory had been rising since the sinking of HMS Prince

of Wales and Pearl Harbor. Thai historians often differ on that opinion and accept Pi bun's
own explanation:
The military alliance and, to a greater degree, the declaration of war were
intended to prove to Japan that there would be no stab in the back. The recovery
of more lost territories, offered by Japan on the day of the invasion and at first
rejected by the Thais, proved a secondary concern. It could be said that all the
steps of the march into the Japanese camp were aimed at preventing negative
developments, rather than in attaining positive objectives. 126

125 Bangkok Chronicle, February 12, 1942.
126 Kamon, 150.
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Admittedly, the territorial gains were of secondary importance. But, the ultimate goal of
the government, namely: Pibun, was to stay in power (its loss would be the negative
development mentioned above).
Many scholars see the opportunism of Pibun as his reason for joining the war on
the Japanese side. 127 Some argue it happened because he believed in Pan-Asianism or, as
a true patriot, wanted to advance the national interest. 128 But, the issue of disarmament of
the Thai military needs closer analysis. The conflict with Indo-China ended in a stalemate
at a time when France had just lost to Germany, and its Asian possession became a
Japanese military base. The humble successes in border skirmishes proved the pitiful
state of Thai military. Pibun realized the weakness very soon. The decision to order a
cease-fire on the morning of the Japanese incursion came very quickly' as he had been
aware of the army's incapacity. Asada wrote in his memoir:
At that time, Thailand had about a hundred thousand soldiers, but their
military equipment was old, dating to the days of imperialism, and unsuitable for
modern international warfare. To borrow a recent Japanese expression, they were
an "army without military power," whose raison d'etre was to provide a domestic
base for Pibun's political power. 129
Tsubokami and a Japanese General Iida did not expect much of the Thai army as
an ally either. 130 Indeed, the Thai army was not allowed to participate in the campaigns of
Japan's Southern Army until May 1942. The decision to allow it to take Kengtung from
Chiang Kai-shek's withdrawing 93rd Army was made to reinforce Pibun's political
position rather than to help the Japanese troops. 131 The Thai army performed poorly as
expected. It lacked exact maps and appropriate horses, and was otherwise terribly

127 Flood, Numnonda, Swan, Reynolds, Aldrich, Songsri Foran, Nuntana.
128 Batson and Shimizu, 66; Charnvit, 60.
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unprepared. 132 Pibun himself admitted that his army had not been capable of resisting an
outside enemy. 133
The army was too weak to protect the country, but it certainly was a sufficient
force to keep a dictator in power. Thai armed forces consisted of approximately 60,000
soldiers, two hundred airplanes (of which the pursuit planes were obsolete), and fifteen
regiments of field artillery and one regiment of medium artillery. The equipment also
included eighty tanks, several hundred trucks, and one platoon of armored cars. Thai navy
had two heavy gunboats, two light gunboats, thirty-six naval planes, and six thousand
personnel. 134
Pibun was a leader of a military faction, the Field Marshal, and he exercised great
influence among tfie military parliament members whom he had appointed. He had long
favored his soldiers. Only in 1941, he awarded eight thousand decorations to the military
and appointed thirty generals. 135 The army, even considering its "downtrodden state,"
provided a sense of sovereignty. 136 Whereas on the issue of sovereignty the meaning of
the army was only symbolic, the army prevented civilian rule (in the end of 1941only one
third of the Cabinet was civilian), provided Pibun with political support, and executed his
dictatorial whims. For example, in February 1943, following a quarrel with his wife, he
resigned from the post-an event that was publicly announced. On the next day, however,
he changed his mind and resumed the rule with the aid of armored cars. 137
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The Assembly was enthusiastic about the alliance and fully supported the
declaration of war, particularly because of the first clause of the secret protocol attached
to it: "The Japanese Government will cooperate in the realization of Thailand's demands
for the return of its lost territories. " 138 People warmly welcomed the Japanese troops (if
the press could be trusted). Among the politicians, none could oppose the planned
irredenta. The army, instead of being disarmed, gained importance, and so did the Field
Marshal whose traditional power base was the military. Pibun stormed through the crisis
and continued to hold the rudder, only sailing a different course.
The Japanese presence since December 8, solidified the political status quo of the
time. Pibun became very closely associated with the Japanese camp. Through Japan,
Thailand could enlarge its territory. Also, Japanese propaganda flooded Bangkok. The
slogan "Asia for Asiatics" and the idea of a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" were successfully
implanted on Thai soil and helped to galvanize the nation around the militaristic leader.
Until the beginning of the war Pibun tried to maintain good relations with both
Japan and the Allies, angling to gain territory and advantages in a bidding war between
the sides. Asada was convinced how anti-British Pibun was, while Crosby, also on very
good terms with Pibun, did not consider him pro-Japanese or anti-Western. 139 Crosby did
not realize the emptiness of Pibun's words until later. Retrospectively, the long time
Minister to Thailand described its Field Marshal as a "human weather vane." 140 As late as
December 4, 1941 Pibun requested a joint Anglo-American declaration of support for
Thailand. 141 His procrastination culminated in his disappearance from Bangkok on

138 Swan, "Japanese Economic," 169, 234.
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December 7. As early as 1940 he had committed himself to Japan, but he maintained
some flexibility as late as December 1941. Notwithstanding, he promulgated the Act of
Resistance in September 1941, while maintaining the appearances of strict neutrality.
Obviously, Pibun had made more commitments than he could fulfill. Thus, his actions
should not be analyzed considering his commitments, but considering what he thought
would keep him in power.
Pibun's words and the commitments he made, although taken seriously by his
contemporaries, meant little to him.
I once said it would be splendid to fight and die ( ... ). That would bring
honor. But that is to arouse the feelings of the people, because the propaganda of
the government before troubles begin and after they have begun has to be two
different things. Before trouble comes we have to act fearless in every way. Now
that's all passed, meaning all that about fighting to the last man. 142
These words were not likely to soothe the families of those who died defending Thailand
on December 7, 1941. Such were Pibun's beliefs concerning propaganda, but Pibun's
attitude towards treaties was not different. In December 1941 he declared:
I do not consider this pact as a simple diplomatic document but as a sacred
document. I have therefore arranged for the signature of this pact to be done in the
Royal Chapel before the Emerald Buddha which is highly worshipped by the
people not only in Thailand but also in Burma and a great part of India. 143

Here his words from December 5 are worth recalling. Pibun had said that honor was
Thailand 's life and soul and that Thailand was safe unless the Great Powers treated the
non-aggression agreements like mere scraps of paper. In fact, it was Pi bun who did so.
Soon afterwards, Pibun's lack of integrity or even a single principle, beside staying in
power, amazed even his own ministers: "I do not treat the pact of alliance with Japan as

142 Swan, "Japanese Economic," 275. [Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting]
143 Pibun quoted in Swan, "Japanese Economic," 168.
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more than a scrap of paper. I can tear it up anytime." 144 Pibun later claimed that the
declaration of war against Britain and the United States was a trick to fool Japan. 145
Obviously, the ideas of democracy remained foreign to Pi bun, and the monuments
he built to it apparently did not influence his political thought. The emptiness of his
ideology adopted from Japan, Pan-Asianism, became evident in his dealings with the
West after the war. 146 The idea of "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was merely
another ideology Pibun chose to utilize. It gave the Thais political and economic hope. 147
Pi bun used religion and a variety of ideologies to which he never truly subscribed.
Pibun' s sympathies were neither pro-Western nor pro-Japanese, although diplomats of
both sides considered him their ally. When the country under his leadership was
threatened by war, 'he was mainly concerned about the political results of the choices he
was making and the fate of the supporting him army.
Undeniably, Pibun was very popular among his people. Many still revere their
Field Marshal. This cannot be explained only by omnipresent propaganda. He employed
several ideas to gain popular support. He managed to make nationalism, the powerful
force shaping many nations' histories, a tool for his own use. He appealed to the ideas of
democracy, pan-Asianism, territorial expansion, and patriotism. Still, people did not turn
against him when it became apparent that he believed in none of the above. His
popularity came from his character traits. He was extremely self-confident, lacking
principles, yet determined to carry out his ideas, and sufficiently ruthless to risk
Thailand's interest for his personal benefit. Considering that such a man in effect
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constituted the Thai government, the evident reason for Thai participation in the Pacific
War was to prolong Pibun's dictatorship.
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